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Introduction
Shanghai – China’s largest city – is strategically 
situated along the banks of the Yangtze River. 
Once serving as a major Treaty Port, Shanghai 
represents China’s colonial legacy as well as the 
point of origin for the country’s recent phenomenal 
economic growth. Its relatively short urban history 
sprang to life in the late 19th century when the arrival 
of European and American investors created an 
influx of capital and expertise. After 1949, Shanghai 
was transformed into a centrally-planned industrial 
powerhouse. It was not until 1978’s Open Door 
Policy that Shanghai’s potential as a gateway to 
wealth and modernity started to emerge. Today, 
this topographically flat city accommodates some 
15 million people1 (which continues to float) within 
an area of two thousand square miles. Shanghai’s 
gross domestic income is higher than that of Beijing, 
and its growth rate is higher than China’s national 
average. The Pudong New Development Zone, 
where the Lujiazui CBD is located, opened for busi-
ness in 1992. This area serves as a portrait of a 
modern China for the rest of the world, appearing in 
mainstream media, most notably in 2006’s Mission 
Impossible 3. As a city with unabashed global ambi-
tions, Shanghai has been among the fastest growing 
cities in the world, especially during the last decade 
of the 20th century. Although Shanghai’s popula-
tion growth has slowed considerably since 2000,2 
the city is still expanding, chasing Bangkok as the 
consumer-driven cosmopolis of Asia.
 Shanghai’s rapid population growth, driven prima-
rily by immigration from other (more rural) parts of 
China and made possible by a relaxation of the 
hukou system3 has had unforeseen consequences 
on urbanism and urban form. In addition to Deng’s 
Open Door modernisation the progressive politics 
of Shanghai’s local government enabled the rise of 
these consequences. The unique sensibility of the 
Chinese, nurtured by the pragmatism of its integra-
tion of socialist market principles along the lines of 
national characteristics, further enabled change to 
take place. Yet, Shanghai’s Pudong area ultimately 
owes its existence to the soft cultural infrastructure 
of Shanghai’s cosmopolitanism and its facilitation 
of the city’s heterogeneous nature. It seems like 
architecture and urban form are, and will continue 
to be, utilised as tangible representations of the 
city’s expected growth – the physical articulations 
of the perceptions of global progress. This paper 
aims to present a series of observations identifying 
its rationale, pointing out the conditions that not only 
underlay the making of this urban complexity, but 
also characterise the reality of the city.
 It is first useful to understand the goals of the city 
as underpinning the specific ‘cause’ that transforms 
its physicality. Can Shanghai really be the global 
metropolis for the 21st century? The answer to this 
question lies in how ‘global metropolis’ is defined and 
what is to be expected from it. According to Saskia 
Sassen, a global city is ‘an urban space with new 
economic and political potentialities, which formu-
lates the transnational identity and communicates 
… connecting sites that are not geographically prox-
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imate yet are intensely connected to each other’.4 
By this measure, even without advanced technolo-
gies, Shanghai has always been a global city. The 
definition of a ‘global 21st-century’ city, however, is 
ambiguous, although it can be thought of as a future 
of free-market competition. In this sense the exten-
sive Chinese workforce can also be added to the 
equation.5 In order to achieve the goal in a theoreti-
cal sense, the development of Shanghai’s urbanism 
corresponds to the parameters of a compact urban 
place that provides the soft cultural infrastructure, 
the organisational structure that allows diverse 
architectural cultures to represent different cultural 
norms while still maintaining their representational 
integrity by means of architectural and urban order-
ings. The integrity of ‘form’, or urban identity, is 
required to establish a tangible perception to which 
everyone can relate. The result of this process is the 
making of a cosmopolitan city that can compete in a 
globalised economic context. 
Urbanism and urban form
An aerial view of Puxi, which faces Pudong across 
the river to the west, reveals a series of high-rise 
commercial towers and highways that are super-
imposed on the old fabric of lilong, low-rise row 
houses adapted from the Western tradition to 
accommodate the families of Chinese workers.6 
The stark contrast between low-rise lilong houses 
and corporate high-rises is primarily a result of lax 
(and/or absent) zoning practices and height restric-
tions at the beginning of Deng’s economic reform. 
As polar opposites of urban form – old low-rise 
fabric and the new high-rise buildings – the current 
fabric creates a problematic discourse between old 
forms of inhabitation and the new corporate culture. 
Whereas the gridiron structure and the fabric of 
existing lilong houses could have been used by 
contemporary developers as cultural elements upon 
which to expand, they were instead considered as 
obsolete and, as such, prime targets for demolition.
 
 What epitomises this perspective is Charpentier’s 
Century Avenue, Lujiazui’s main spine. The false 
premise of the avenue begins with the determina-
tion of its width to be exactly ‘one metre wider than 
the Champs Élysées’ in order to denote the triumph 
of the making of this physically significant urban 
element. Its penetration through the diagonal super 
block of parallel housing in Pudong creates irregu-
lar plot shapes. The programming and anticipated 
use of the space in Pudong has never been made 
clear. Although the Municipal Planning Bureau has 
developed comprehensive zoning regulations and 
infrastructure plans, the District Authority Control’s 
process of refining those plans with respect to the 
particular district’s details, i.e. Floor Area Ratio 
and coverage, results in a changing of urban 
form. Moreover, when the plan comes down to the 
Controlled Detailed Planning Section, whose job it is 
to execute decisions, grant permission for buildings, 
and regulate the formal quality of each plot, a series 
of performative rules and regulations re-define the 
final form of the physical design without taking into 
consideration any of the original planning attempts. 
In other words, there is no central organisation that 
gives a comprehensive overview of planning for the 
three planning units, working independently from 
above.7
 So, if we compare the proposed Avenue to its built 
reality, the continuous platform of buildings along 
its length is absent. Charpentier designed Century 
Boulevard to be the primary component that gives 
an appropriate scale to the streets in order to facili-
tate interaction at the base of the buildings before 
getting into the super high-rise buildings. If the plan 
had been faithfully executed, it could have created 
a reasonably strong urban characteristic. In Lujia-
zui, however, not only is the ground that mediates 
the perpendicular change missing, but the arbitrary 
execution of its open space is also disruptive to any 
sense of coherence, conjuring instead a monoto-
nous experience in urban space [figs.1 and 2].8
 This monotony of the urban space is the result 
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Fig. 1: Century Avenue, as originally designed by Arte, Jean Marie Charpentier et Associés. Image: Shanghai Planning 
Museum, Shanghai, P.R.China
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Fig. 2: Century Avenue in reality. Photograph by Peter G. Rowe.
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of a lack of development at the pedestrian scale, 
which might have something to do with the attempt 
to make Lujiazui into another Manhattan. Yet, 
while downtown Manhattan’s dense skyscrapers 
are absorbed within the grid, and its lively street 
life directed by the hyper-dense environment of 
a financial-scape, Pudong’s skyscrapers stand 
out as scattered markers of individual buildings. 
The substantial distances between the buildings, 
between the building and the open space, and 
between the building and the pavement creates a 
lifeless street scene, almost depriving the city of its 
exuberant life. While these actions have served to 
order the amalgamation of the city’s urban form, in 
practice they have overlooked a more important 
concern about the social stratification of a newly 
developed urban place – the issue of politics in the 
making of a civic reality. 
Urbanism and building imagery
Confronted by a jungle of glittering high-rises reminis-
cent of a science-fiction movie, visitors to Shanghai 
might easily come to the conclusion that it is a very 
rich city. Yet these buildings are far from being fully 
occupied, and thus from this perspective, the tall 
buildings in Lujiazui become purely symbolic. The 
decision to position a handful of iconic skyscrapers 
side by side as a means of visual competition with 
other dense cities in the West is telling. The origi-
nal master plan called for some skyscrapers to be 
grouped together in the heart of the CBD, while other 
high-rise buildings were to be scattered randomly 
on both the eastern and western sides of Century 
Boulevard. Such a distribution would have accen-
tuated the role of the towers as signifiers explicitly 
reinforcing an instant identity. These skyscrapers do 
for Shanghai what the Eiffel Tower does for Paris. 
As Roland Barthes puts it, not only does built form 
generate meanings that constitute the conception of 
the city, but the impact of the materialisation of ideas 
also prompts the creation of a new civic realm.9 The 
idea of making a great cityscape consisting of high-
rise buildings and monumental elements is essential 
in the making of Lujiazui. Yet, this district’s tall build-
ings were not built to satisfy the need for vertical 
expansion due to any lack of horizontal space, 
rather they were built for the purpose of generating 
monumental symbolic value.10 The monumentality 
of these urban elements are the unsubtle evidence 
of the actions taken by municipal government, and 
fulfilled by the developer and designer, in the making 
of the particular ‘form’ that recalls the patriotic past 
of China. It is not surprising that their pragmatism 
would lead to the easiest way of establishing a level 
economic playing field, if not a superior economic 
playing field, by building the highest skyscrapers: 
the players being Shanghai’s competitors seeking 
global-city status.
 This is evident from the attempt by Shanghai’s 
authority, and its development partner, to make the 
Jin Mao Tower and the World Financial Centre the 
tallest buildings in the world, and to be located in the 
Lujiazui master plan. Both designs come from elite 
American architectural firms, and are programmed 
to be mixed-use developments, consisting of office 
space, hotel rooms, conference halls, observation 
decks, with shopping complexes on their ground 
floors. For the Jin Mao Tower, the upper part of its 
trunk is simply an ultra-high atrium surrounded by the 
corridors of hotel rooms, wrapped by a curtain-wall 
skin. The elevation of the building to that extreme 
height is an obvious manifestation of monumental-
ity. Considering that labour in China is inexpensive, 
the construction of both these buildings does not 
require as much financial investment as would have 
been the case if they were to be erected in America 
or Europe.11
 The semiotic quality of both buildings is obviously 
intended in yet another manner: the local expres-
sive references and the deliberate acquisition of 
visible symbols of progress.12 It is as if their build-
ing is concrete proof of the ability to match Western 
architecture style in height and grandeur, while 
simultaneously leaving a unique indelible mark. 
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The 88-story high Jin Mao Tower was designed to 
resemble the ancient Kaifang pagoda (the legen-
dary 11th-century Chinese brick pagoda in Henan 
province) to instil a sense of nationalism in the local 
population. The design of the 460-metre tall World 
Financial Centre has been the object of debate over 
the abstract connotations of the circular void on the 
top of the building. This, by chance, hit on a sensi-
tive issue between China and Japan. The New York 
Times journalist Howard French comments: 
The representative of Mr. Minoru Mori [one of 
Japan’s foremost real estate developers who funded 
the building of the World Financial Centre] gamely 
protested that the circle with the sky ride was based 
on a traditional Chinese symbol – the moon gate 
– but in the end they quietly backed down, replacing 
the hole with a squarish slot.13
 Also, even after the design had been finalised, 
some ten to twenty additional floors were added to 
the building. This is because the clients demanded 
that the building be not only a World Financial 
Centre, but also the world’s tallest building.14 The 
confidence of modern Chinese capitalism was 
confirmed in the making of ‘form’ – the envelope 
that uses the marvel of engineering technology.15
 What this perspective evokes is not the unique-
ness of urban semiotics in Shanghai, but the certain 
way in which high-rise buildings are pre-conceptual-
ised with a simple inference of power manifestation 
at work. 
Urbanism and streetscapes
The skyline iconography makes one wonder how 
people on the street experience it. Leaving aside 
the issue of mimicking Manhattan, since we cannot 
assume the planner of Lujiazui had in mind the 
necessity of socialisation at the pavement level, 
one can conclude that the streets in Lujiazui are 
not efficiently used given their excessive width. 
Century Boulevard has eight traffic lanes, one traffic 
island, four bicycle lanes (two each way), and two 
pavements that are as wide as the traffic lanes, all 
comprising a total width of more than 330 feet. All 
the streets that branch off the Boulevard are half 
this width. The district is not dense, hence the public 
activity encouraged by urban theorists such as Jane 
Jacobs does not exist.16 This problem has been 
observed by the Shanghai municipality, which has 
since retrofitted the pavements by embedding them 
with a series of pocket landscape parks in order to 
humanise their size.
 Despite the fact that Lujiazui is deserted at first 
glance, what might shed light on the situation is 
a comparison between the condition of streets in 
Lujiazui and ‘pre-Lujiazui’ Shanghai. Street life is 
fostered by human-scale elements (both planned 
and ad hoc) corresponding to the nature of the dwell-
ers’ norms of inhabitation. This observation takes 
the methods by which the street was functionally 
and culturally conceived in pre-Lujiazui Shanghai 
as a point of reference. Prior to the development of 
Pudong in the early 1990s, Pudong was basically 
an undeveloped territory with scatted permanent 
settlements. To understand the interaction between 
architecture and the urban form in terms of how its 
people perceive their city, it is essential also to look 
at how streets in Puxi have historically formed and 
performed over time.
 In 1930’s Puxi, the main interactions between 
the building and the street were business transac-
tions. Pavements served as the mediation. Beyond 
the mediating pavement, however, labour activi-
ties, as well as various modes of transport, were 
taking place. There were always Chinese labour-
ers loading and unloading cargo from ships, pulling 
rickshaws and, waiting for customers, walking along 
the street hoping to get itinerant employment. The 
Bund was usually crowded, but it was never over-
crowded, since the major public and commercial 
spaces were located in the inner parts of the city, 
in the foreign settlements. One of the most fashion-
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able vistas was from the top of a building on the 
West Bund, looking down to a street that curves to 
the east. Here, the Custom House and the Bank of 
China were the monumental landmarks. Five modes 
of transportation were used on the Bund, according 
to the status of the passengers: foot, bicycle, rick-
shaw, tram, and car. In contrast to the streets of the 
Bund, the streets of Lujiazui are confined to a single 
narrative. While the Bund embraced energetic 
street dynamism by its functioning as a reception 
point and travel corridor, Lujiazui streets are usually 
empty and deserted, illustrating the complete failure 
to relate the scale of the building to the scale of 
the pavement. The size of streets in Pudong is not 
defined by prevailing modes of transportation or 
commercial requirements; instead, it is demarcated 
by a political agenda: to convey monumentality that 
helps to reinforce a sense of nationalism.17
Urbanism and the visualisation of the skylines
Both skylines, facing each other across the river, 
are important icons of this former Treaty Port city. 
The similarity between the two is that the images 
of both are meant to display the expectant future of 
this urban place. For the Bund, it was the commer-
cial value of individual business on the Treaty Port’s 
shore, which the appearance of a Western envi-
ronment could reinforce. The making of the Bund 
skyline comes from an internal need: the need for 
visual representation using built form was necessi-
tated by the establishment of the various external 
cultures that existed in Shanghai from the opening 
of the Treaty Port. In contrast, the visual represen-
tation of Pudong is a result of an external push. 
As the Bund is a linear corridor, the appearance of 
the building is vividly experienced as a panorama 
– the height of a building is not as important as the 
degree to which it can be seen from afar; a build-
ing can be clearly perceived no matter where the 
viewers are. But for Pudong, with a setting that 
spans the large urban space, the height and size of 
buildings are essential, which is why the planning of 
Pudong favours high-rise buildings. Though specifi-
cally designed for effect, their effect is weaker than 
that of the ad hoc Bund.
 In Kevin Lynch’s terms, this understanding reso-
nates with the ‘pre-conceived imagery – something 
to which the observer can relate by virtue of its 
spatial relations to the observer.’18 The Bund is a 
skyline that allows both visual and physical interac-
tions between the city and its people, for the image 
one sees and the physical interactions with the build-
ings are firmly reinforced by its inhabitable quality. 
Pudong’s skyline, however, is relatively abstract. 
Not only is the composition of the Pudong skyline 
too complex to be perceived comprehensively 
(only outlines and gestures are expressed through 
visuals), but the human scale is also lost in the over-
whelmingly vast and pedestrian-unfriendly planning 
of its public space. For instance, Century Avenue is 
too wide given the height of the surrounding build-
ings, and its lack of public functions. Considering 
the vastness of the space unrelated to Everyman’s 
sense of scale, it is difficult to imagine how a person 
would be able to coherently conceive and remem-
ber the physical space by its urban characteristics. 
Yet, Pudong is not without living beings. Coming up 
from a subway station, visitors encounter the lack 
of directional indicators; they might not even have 
any clue that they have arrived in Pudong. Despite 
the clarity of Pudong’s high-rise buildings when 
viewed from the Puxi shore, they do not help to 
orient people because they are placed arbitrarily in 
the vast concrete landscape of Lujiazui, which does 
not enable visitors to relate themselves to anything 
familiar. Then, as they start to walk from the Orien-
tal Pearl Tower, at the north-western end of Century 
Avenue, to Lujiazui Park, the area’s central park, it 
takes fifteen minutes. The distance between these 
vertical and horizontal icons of the city is more than 
enough for the impression of the monumentality of 
the vertical to disappear and to be replaced by the 
flatness of the horizon without a single remnant of 
the mental image of the city. The size of the Avenue 
and the location of the buildings do fulfil the intended 
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political posturing, but the overwhelming scale frag-
ments any visual effect.
 The much-celebrated image of Pudong is appar-
ent only when viewed from a distance. Regarding 
its principal connotation of progress by means of 
built form, Pudong needs the entire environment. 
While the Bund does not need a major iconic build-
ing to define its symbolic significance, the image of 
Pudong is dominated by the unorthodox appear-
ance of the ‘Pearl’, the pagoda-shaped skyscraper, 
and the series of modern reflective-skin buildings. 
The inevitable emergence of modern and contem-
porary building typologies disturbs the cultural 
identity and the way in which people conceive their 
meanings. Both the Bund and Pudong are case 
studies of how complicated uses of architecture as 
visuals in a city construct meaning vis-à-vis global 
narrative. Notwithstanding the tradition of naively 
mimicking skylines, because ‘Manhattan has many 
skyscrapers’, the fact that they are really ‘assem-
bling’ it without a thorough understanding of their 
own need is critical. This causes new cities to look 
like one another. A fact re-asserted by The Econo-
mist: ‘No wonder that swathes of Seoul look like 
swathes of Shanghai. Even the most ambitious 
buildings, many designed by trophy architects who 
flit from one country to the next, often seem alien to 
their environs.’19
 Whether they fail or not, it is certain that they are 
trying to convey to the world their own messages 
of monumentality in service to a larger agenda of 
the identities of power. Observed by Jennie Chen: 
‘It [Shanghai] has been torn asunder by colonialism, 
war, political exhaustion, economic ebbs and flows, 
and social implosions. Yet look at it now; it is spec-
tacular by all visual standards.’20
Conclusion
The selling point of Shanghai’s tourism in the early 
twentieth century was the elegant image that repli-
cated Western neo-classical styles. The insistent 
focus on the monumental, iconic representation of 
Shanghai consistently obscured its human scale, 
especially the sense of inhabitation of the city. Histor-
ically, the Bund was on the tourist map because of 
its iconographic nature. Its accommodation of many 
intruding cultures did not succeed in mediating 
between tradition and modernity, but rather inclined 
toward abrupt representations of external cultural 
norms. Also apparent in a microcosmic perspective, 
the inherent contradiction between local and foreign 
notions of open space – observed from the street 
scenes – represented the other notion of a modern 
Chinese city, particularised by the tension between 
the leap towards Western modernity and finding a 
new Chinese identity through a mixture of diversi-
fied cultures.
 What the observations in this paper suggest is 
a fourfold conclusion. Firstly, that there was a lack 
of coordination in the planning process, which 
resulted in a fragmented urban fabric. Secondly, 
the overwhelming reliance on the monumental-
ity of urban elements, such as high-rise buildings, 
without any concern for their utilitarian role in the 
city, is not conducive to a felicitous distribution of 
density in Shanghai’s current urban environment. 
Thirdly, there is an absence of the human scale in 
the streetscape that diminishes contact, the sense 
of security, and the pedestrian energy level of the 
city. And fourthly, the production of the city as an 
image creates, as suggested by the first conclusion, 
a fragmented urban form and urban spatial organi-
sation. This is the reality of Lujiazui.
 Whether or not pedestrians saw the monumental 
buildings along the Bund as urban icons of which 
they should be proud, or as a mimicry of the Western 
metropolis that eroded their Chinese identity, is 
important to the holistic understanding of Shanghai, 
which has to be contextualised and understood from 
every possible angle. Knowing how and from where 
we view the history of Shanghai enables us to see 
beyond the veneer of the magnificent scenery of the 
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Bund and approach the fuller ‘reality’ of Shanghai.
Notes 
1. Shanghai’s populations as of 2007 is just shy of 15 
million according to the UN’s World Urbanization Pros-
pects 2007 Revision, accessible online here - http://esa.
un.org/unup/index.asp?panel=4
2. According to the UN World Urbanization Prospects 
2007 Revision, Shanghai’s population grew about 
4.8% annually between 1990 and 2000, however the 
rate has since slowed to about 1.7%, still roughly 3 
times the national growth rate.
3. The hukou system is a registration system that 
afforded residents access to local government benefits 
like education, health care, and welfare, but restricted 
in-country migration as these benefits were only avail-
able in the locale where a citizen was registered (e.g. 
if you were a resident of Beijing, you could not move 
to Shanghai and receive government benefits nor 
easily gain employment, and vice versa). As China 
has modernised and opened its borders per se, the 
hukou system is fading into obscurity, allowing massive 
in-country migration, usually to where employment is 
plentiful.
4. Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (London: 
Pine Forge Press, 2006), p. 73.
5. Jyoti Thottam, ‘On the Job in China’ and ‘The Growing 
Dangers of the China Trade’, Time, 170, 2, (2007) pp. 
27-31.
6. For a detailed study of lilong see Non Arkaraprasertkul, 
‘Toward Shanghai’s Urban Housing: Re-Defining 
Shanghai’s Lilong’, in Proceeding of the Sixth China 
Urban Housing Conference in Beijing, P.R. China, Hong 
Kong: Center of Housing Innovations at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong and Ministry of Construction, 
P.R. China. 2007; and Non Arkaraprasertkul and Reilly 
Rabitaille, ‘Contemporary Lilong: Revitalizing Shang-
hai’s Ingenious Housing’, Proceeding of the Fourth 
International Conference of Planning and Design in 
Tainan, R.C.China. Tainan, Taiwan: College of Planning 
and Design, National Cheng Kung University, 2007. 
7. In his research, urban planner Tingwei Zhang refers to 
these levels in the administrative structure of Shang-
hai as the municipal government (for the Municipal 
Planning Bureau), urban district (a district may have 
more than one million population; the largest district in 
Shanghai has 1.6 million population; for District Author-
ity Control), and street offices (sub-district government, 
with a size approximately equal to a company in U.S. 
cities; for Controlled Detailed Planning Section). See 
Tingwei Zhang, ‘Urban Development and a Socialist 
Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai’, in Urban Affairs 
Review 37, 475 (2002), p. 485.
8. Dong Nan Nan and Stephanie Ruff, ‘Managing Urban 
Growth in Shanghai’,  in City Strategies, 58 (2007), p. 
32.
9. Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower, and Other Mytholo-
gies, trans. by Richard Howard, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997). Also partially re-published in 
Neil Leach, Rethinking Architecture, pp.172-80.
10. Ma Qingyun asserts ‘Pudong has certain existing 
dimensions of symbolic quality, to represent ambition 
and achievement in its new form of urbanization.’ See 
Louisa Lim, Shanghai Urban Development: The Future 
Is Now, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=6600367 [accessed July 8, 2007]
11. Read more about criticisms and comments on modern 
towers in China in Layla Dawson, ‘Towers to People’, 
in China’s New Dawn: An Architectural Transformation 
(New York: Prestel, 2005), pp.16-33.
12. Peter G. Rowe, East Asia Modern: Shaping the 
Contemporary City (London: Reaktion, 2005), p. 137.
13. Howard French, ‘Shanghai Journal’, in ‘World 
Skyscraper Race, It Isn’t Lonely at the Top’, The New 
York Times, 8 May 2007. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=FB0A15F83D550C7B8CDDAC089
4DF404482 [accessed: 11 May 2007]
14. Ibid. The core of the article reads: ‘while diplomatic, the 
explanation strains creditability, especially for anyone 
who knows the history. The Shanghai building was 
originally designed to have 94 floors, rising to roughly 
1,509 feet, but has quietly grown since then, with more 
floors added, as well as more height to each floor, 
resulting in about 105 extra feet.’
15. See detail about the projects, renderings, and criti-
cisms of both buildings in Xing Ruan, New China 
51
Architecture (Hong Kong: Periplus, 2006), pp. 125-31, 
Dawson, New Dawn, pp. 74-7, and Bernard Chan, New 
Architecture in China (New York; Merrell, 2005), pp. 6-
15.
16. Jane Jacobs, ‘The Use of Sidewalks: Contacts’, in The 
Death and Life of the Great American Cities, (New 
York: Vintage, 1961), pp. 55-73.
17. Rowe, East Asia, pp. 134-7.
18. Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge; MA: 
MIT Press, 1960), p. 8.
19. ‘In Place of God: Culture Replaces Religion’, The 
Economist, 383 (8527, 5-11 May 2007), pp.14.
20. Jennie Chen, ‘Urban Architextures: A Search for an 
Authentic Shanghai’ (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 
2003), p. 59.
Acknowledgements
The author owes considerable gratitude for the forbear-
ance, instruction and special knowledge of scholars who 
have guided and mentored him throughout this research: 
Stanford Anderson, Yung Ho Chang, John W. Dower, 
Shigeru Miyagawa, Dennis Frenchman, and Jan Wampler 
from Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Robert 
Cowherd from Wentworth Institute of Technology; and 
Peter G. Rowe, Li Hou, and Dr. Shou Lei from Harvard 
Graduate School of Design. The author’s special thanks 
go to the wonderful editing of Andrew Gulbrandson, Reilly 
Rabitaille, and Victor Wong.
Biography
Non Arkaraprasertkul is Visiting Lecturer in Architec-
ture and Urban Design at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Trained 
in History, Theory, Criticism and Urban Design at MIT, 
Arkaraprasertkul is a Bangkok-based practicing archi-
tect,  urban designer and Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture 
and Urbanism at Chulalongkorn University. His interests 
concern issues of contemporary architecture and urban-
ism, specifically the effects of cultural construction on built 
form.
52
